He told the agents that he possessed pornographic images and videos of children ranging in age from four to twelve. He attended a community college part-time for four semesters, pursuing a career as a lab technician and paying his own tuition. However, Helm had been sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for uttering a “no account” check for 0, and his prior felonies also were minor, nonviolent crimes. The FBI's analysis of Marshall's computer and other media revealed 261 images and 46 videos containing child pornography. The Defendant Aside from his involvement with child pornography, it appears that Marshall was headed toward becoming a productive member of society. He worked as a machine operator for a commercial bakery. During an interview with his probation officer, Marshall said that he first started using file sharing programs to acquire music. By contrast, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Rummel and found constitutional a sentence of twenty-five years to life imposed upon a fifth felony theft conviction. We decline to create exceptions, even for offenders with rare physiological conditions. So long as “the provisions at issue plainly demarcate the range of penalties that prosecutors and judges may seek and impose,” “the power that Congress has delegated to those officials is no broader than the authority they routinely exercise in enforcing the criminal laws.
Because Marshall is not a juvenile, he does not qualify for the Eighth Amendment protections accorded to juveniles. Additional Challenges Marshall challenges his sentence on three additional grounds. Marshall contends that this provision, commonly known as the “parsimony provision,” conflicts with the 5–year mandatory minimum sentence required for defendants guilty of knowingly receiving child pornography. Furthermore, even when two statutes prohibit the exact same conduct, the prosecutor can choose which statute to charge under. Third and finally, Marshall argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court thought it should have discretion to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum but did not do so.
We therefore need not determine whether a mandatory 5–year sentence for a juvenile would be unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's reasoning in Miller v. These arguments lack merit and require only brief discussion. Marshall believes that in his situation a 5–year sentence is greater than necessary to accomplish the penological goals of deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. “[A] district court's ardent desire to go lower does not make a statutory mandatory minimum sentence unreasonable.” Cecil, 615 F.3d at 695.
Child Growth Foundation, Puberty and the Growth Hormone Deficient Child, Growth Hormone Deficiency: A Guide for Parents and Patients, 4 (June 2010), available at tion.org/CMS/FILES/03_Growth Hormone It involves asking the subject to match pictures with words that “[s]tart out pretty concrete or simple” and “become increasingly more abstract.” Id. The trouble with this argument is that the record does not show a direct link between his physiological condition and his mental immaturity. The district court concluded that “at the time of the crime [Marshall] was, and should be characterized for sentencing as, a developmentally immature teenager lacking the ability to appreciate the illegality of child pornography and to control his viewing of easily accessible internet content.” Ibid. It simply disregards them as irrelevant because of Marshall's chronological age. The Court in Miller recognized the obvious fact that these features of adolescence do not instantly disappear upon the arrival of one's eighteenth birthday, which presumably prompted the Court to observe that “ ‘youth is more than a chronological fact.’ “ Id. And it does not render immaterial for an Eighth Amendment analysis the fact that a defendant has the mental characteristics of a juvenile. In reaching that conclusion, the Court identified the same features that diminished the defendant's culpability as in the juvenile cases. at 318 (“Because of their impairments, ․ [mentally retarded persons], by definition ․ have diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.”). Indeed, the Court, in essence, has equated diminished mental capabilities of juveniles and mentally retarded persons as the central justification for its categorical restrictions on types of sentences for classes of individuals: both juveniles and mentally retarded individuals are “categorically less culpable than the average criminal.” Roper, 543 U. Marshall argues that under all the circumstances, the sentence is excessive.
When he was diagnosed at age 15, Marshall was extremely small for his age and had not yet entered puberty. One of the sources Marshall cites for information on Human Growth Hormone Deficiency notes that children with this disorder have normal intelligence. The district court found that Marshall exhibited all the traits identified by the Supreme Court in its juvenile sentencing cases. Nor is the Supreme Court's categorical bar to certain types of sentences limited to those who are chronological juveniles, that is, under 18 years old. In Atkins, the defendant was an adult, but he had the “mental age” of between 9 and 12 years old. The Eighth Amendment states that “cruel and unusual punishments [shall not be] inflicted.” Sentences that are “excessive” violate that prohibition.
A decent place to eat was within walking distance and a gas station was also close. Not many people there and traffic noise was very low. Located just off Interstate 80 and Interstate 90, this Ohio hotel is 4 miles from Ironwood Golf Club. Cable TV is included in the spacious, traditionally decorated guest rooms.
The front desk at this pet-friendly hotel is staffed 24-hours a day. Toledo Express Airport and Harrison Lake State Park are a 25-minute drive from Wauseon Inn.
He did not know it was wrong until the FBI appeared at his parents' house. Forgac noted that Marshall appeared younger than his chronological age. He stated in his report that in addition to delayed physical growth, “[i]t is quite possible that self-perception and self-concept would also be significantly delayed.” R. He found that Marshall “appear[ed] to be quite immature for his chronological age due to his condition, ․ which inhibited his growth and maturation physically, emotionally and socially.” Id. Forgac's report to the district court along with his sentencing memorandum. From all objective indications, Marshall was functioning as a normal 20–year–old, not as a 15 1/2–year–old. These features that distinguish juveniles from adults have prompted the Supreme Court to impose limits under the authority of the Eighth Amendment upon specific kinds of sentences and sentencing practices for juvenile offenders.
He administered a test called the Ammons Quick Test, which indicated that Marshall had an I. “It is quite likely that in all ways other than chronological age, this individual was still a juvenile at the time of his arrest.” Id. Forgac believed that “Marshall's behavior was a product of adolescent curiosity, moral immaturity and easy availability of pornography.” Id. He recommended “education, monitoring and supervision and the opportunity to mature to age appropriate levels both physically and psychologically.” Id. His sentencing hearing was scheduled for June 4, 2012, but after reviewing the case and meeting with counsel, the district court postponed the hearing so that Dr. And even if we agreed with Marshall's assertion that his growth hormone deficiency rendered him “literally unable to grow up,” we would still not be inclined to classify him as a juvenile. Second, children are thought to be more vulnerable to negative peer pressure and other influences and “lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.” Ibid. For instance, the Court has imposed an absolute bar to the imposition of the death penalty upon defendants under age 18.
Indeed, Marshall's size and self-perceived age undergird most of the arguments he has raised on this appeal. § 3553(a) to “fashion an appropriate sentence.” Id. It further opined that in Marshall's case, the mandatory minimum sentence might be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Marshall claims that based on his growth hormone deficiency, the district court explicitly found him to be a mental and physical juvenile and warns that such factual findings cannot be rejected absent clear error. Under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning juveniles and the Eighth Amendment, the only type of “age” that matters is chronological age. at 2460 (“We therefore hold that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ”); Graham v. The reasons for according special protections to offenders under 18 cannot be used to extend the same protections to offenders over 18. The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18.
In 2005, when Marshall was 15, he was diagnosed with Human Growth Hormone Deficiency. It found that the “[t]estimony and other evidence at [Marshall's] sentencing hearing support[ed] the conclusion that at the time of the crime [Marshall] was, and should be characterized for sentencing as, a developmentally immature teenager lacking the ability to appreciate the illegality of child pornography and to control his viewing of easily accessible internet content.” Id. The district court believed that the mandatory minimum sentence for receipt of child pornography was in “direct conflict” with its responsibility under 18 U. The Supreme Court's decisions limiting the types of sentences that can be imposed upon juveniles all presuppose that a juvenile is an individual with a chronological age under 18. The Supreme Court has recognized that drawing lines based on chronological age is a not-entirely-desirable but nonetheless necessary approach. Simmons, the Court extended from 16 to 18 the age under which offenders are constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty. By the same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach. Chronological age sets the boundaries for determining whether an individual is eligible to drive, vote, marry, buy and drink alcohol, be drafted, watch certain movies, and hold certain political offices. His immaturity did not render him ineligible for these benefits the law granted him by virtue of his chronological age.
But despite his condition, Marshall was an adult at the time of the offense. The agent traced the IP address of the individual's computer to a residence in Wauseon, Ohio. His two prior felonies consisted of fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain worth of goods and services, a felony punishable by two to ten years in prison; and passing a forged check for .36, a crime punishable by two to five years in prison. Second, the court must then “compare the defendant's sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Ibid. This court and others have documented well the devastating and long-lasting effects that the creation and dissemination of child pornography have on its victims, inflicting emotional, physical, and psychological damage, sometimes permanently. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758, 766 (6th Cir.2012); see also New York v. Applying that reasoning to a five-year mandatory sentence is too great a span to be supported by the Court's rationale.